2008 Press Releases
Press Briefing with Ambassador David M. Satterfield
Foreign Press Association, London
June 26, 2008
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I want to make a few opening remarks explaining both why I am here, and also offering some general observations on the state of affairs in Iraq. Then I want to give the majority of time for your questions.
I am here for consultations which I conduct periodically with the UK government, discussing Iraq. The UK is a critical partner, both of the United States and of the Iraqi government, both in a political and civilian sense, as well as in a military sense.
Iraq is a dynamic country. It is a country experiencing considerable and significant transformation and evolution, the consequence of the last 18 months of steadily diminishing violence, progressive security, progressive stabilization. Certainly, Iraq faces many challenges.
Without question, the gains made on the security side -- the product of Iraq's forces becoming more capable, more able to take on the challenge of security increasingly on their own, the product of the surge of U.S. forces and their application to population security over the course of the past year, the product of the Sunni Awakenings, or Sahwat, which had the double impact of taking away the burden of attack on coalition and Iraqi forces by those elements, and shifting pressure to al-Qaeda, the product of changes in the approaches taken by Muqtada al-Sadr and the Jaish al Mahdi towards both the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces, as well as U.S. coalition security forces -- all of this has contributed to 18 months of progressive improvement in security.
With this improvement, with the diminishing of the threat posed in 2006 of sectarian violence erupting into full-fledged sectarian civil war and conflict, political dynamics -- what we would call politics -- has emerged. I believe political dynamics were always present in Iraq, at a grass roots, as well as at a national level, but they were submerged in, or were drowned by the level of violence, particularly sectarian violence, during that period of 2006, late 2005.
We see today in Iraq a political process unfolding that is based upon two fundamental and very important premises. The first is willingness to compromise. The legislative achievements of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, the Iraqi government, Iraq's political leaders, are not based upon monolithic blocks negotiating en masse with rigidly held positions confronting rigidly held positions. They are the product of cross-cutting alliances in which different elements from different political, ethnic, sectarian groupings have found common cause with other elements of other groupings on some issues, have opposed on others. This is the way politics works around the world. It's the way it is working today in Iraq.
The product of these compromises have been significant legislative achievements: a provincial powers law, which is the first attempt to define the actual shape and form of federalism in Iraq, a product of compromise; a pensions reform law; de-Ba'athification law; a national budget, all of which have significant reconciliation elements contained in them.
It is a legislative process which we hope, in the very near future, will produce agreement upon a provincial elections law vital to continued progress on stabilization, continued progress in advancing at a grassroots level, a political process that establishes a firmer link between the elector and the elected official. We expect that provincial elections will be held before the end of the year. The demand for such elections is near universal in Iraq. It will rectify the imbalance created by the Sunni boycott of the initial provincial elections. But, more than that, because of the structure of the anticipated electoral law, it will allow voters a greater opportunity to express their will for specific candidates, rather than for lists in general. That, in turn, we believe, in Iraq as elsewhere, will produce greater accountability at the level of local governments, and certainly will provide a useful precedent as we look to national elections by the end of next year.
Iraq, as I said, faces challenges. Those challenges include the need for continued progress on the political front, continued progress on reconciliation, continued progress and significant progress in mobilizing Iraq's national wealth for the benefit of all Iraqis.
In the words of Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, "Iraq is a fabulously wealthy country." That wealth needs to be moved, needs to be applied for the benefit of Iraq's citizens, particularly in those areas -- Basra, Sadr City, Amara -- where conflict has only recently been ended, where the rule of law, the presence of the state, has only recently been either re-established or established for the first time in the past five years. It is essential that the government of Iraq use its resources to provide essential services to its population, that it provide employment opportunity, economic opportunity for its people.
Kinetic actions, military actions, while very important, are only part of a process of true stabilization, of producing true security for a country emerging from conflict. There must be a vigorous economic track, there must be a vigorous services track. And here, the government of Iraq must do more.
I said at the outset that the progress that has been witnessed in Iraq over these past 18 months was characterized by two different general themes. One is politics, the concept of compromise, of agreement reached through a political process of dialogue between groups, between blocks, between parties yielding legislative or other steps that advance the country's course towards reconciliation. But the other theme can be summed up in a single word: Sovereignty.
I cannot overstate to you the significance, palpable in every sense, in virtually every forum, of Iraq's growing and strong sense that it is a nation possessed of sovereign attributes, a sovereignty that must be respected, that must be acknowledged -- acknowledged internally and acknowledged externally.
Very significant progress has been seen over the past weeks, in terms of regional recognition, recognition by Iraq's neighbors of the reality of a new post-Saddam, post-Ba'ath regime Iraq. This progress has been long in coming. Iraqis and other friends of Iraq have worked long and hard to mobilize this recognition, to help spur greater regional engagement in involvement with the new Iraq. And we are now seeing -- Iraqis are seeing -- the fruits of that progress, the fruits of those efforts.
The visit by Prime Minister Maliki to Jordan, the visit by Foreign Minister of the UAE, Abdullah bin Zayed, to Baghdad, other steps by Egypt, by Bahrain, by Kuwait to move towards, at last, relations with, presence in Iraq, are extremely positive.
Iraq is a part of the Middle East, a vital part. For the Middle East to move forward towards greater stability and security in the face of threats from extremism and extremists, whether al-Qaeda or the state extremism sponsored by Iran, Iraq plays a vital part. Iraq can be of help to the region, and the region can be of help to Iraq. And we are very pleased, as is the government of Iraq, at the steps that have been taken, and that we are confident will continue to be taken by Iraq's neighbors, by the region.
But as we speak of the theme of sovereignty, and the need for recognition of respect for Iraq's sovereignty, we must turn to an issue that has been very much in the attention of the press here, in Iraq, in the United States, around the world. The United States has been engaged in negotiating security arrangements, a strategic partnership, with the government of Iraq.
In August of last year, the leaders of Iraq declared their intention to see Iraq emerge from the Chapter 7 mandate of the UN Security Council that provides for the multi-national force in Iraq no later than December 31st of this year. In November of last year, the President and Prime Minister Maliki concluded a Declaration of Principles, which sketched out the broad outlines of a strategic partnership for the long term between the United States and Iraq, and reaffirmed, in the course of that Declaration of Principles, the goal of ending that Chapter 7 mandate.
And, finally, in December of last year, we negotiated with Iraq letters from the United States to Iraq, from Iraq to the UN Security Council, which again affirmed, and then the Council endorsed, the principle of an end by December 31, 2008 of the Chapter 7 mandate contained in UNSCR 1790.
At Iraqi request, we have, therefore, been proceeding on a course to lay out in further detail the nature of a broad partnership between our two countries, of which security is only one element -- political, economic, social, cultural, scientific, technical cooperation -- to lay a clear basis for a relationship for the long term between our two countries, and we have also been working with Iraq on the fundamental principles, the fundamental assurances required for a presence in Iraq of U.S. and other coalition forces who would continue to provide, as Iraq requests, necessary assistance to Iraq's security forces, to the government of Iraq, as they become progressively more capable, increase their ability to provide for the defense and security of Iraq themselves.
These negotiations are just that. They are negotiations. It is not unusual for an initial position to be countered by another position, for adjustments to be made in an approach. This is what happens when a sovereign state negotiates with another sovereign state. Prime Minister Maliki, when he was in Amman some time ago, noted that some initial approaches taken in those negotiations had reached an impasse. Other positions had then been presented, which allowed negotiations to proceed. Again, not unusual.
We are actively engaged -- literally, today -- in working with the government of Iraq, with our negotiating partners, on seeing how best to move forward to provide the necessary arrangements to allow Iraq to emerge from that Chapter 7 mandate, to provide a new sovereign state to sovereign state bilateral agreement, bilateral understanding, bilateral arrangement, which will allow forces -- both U.S. forces, and potentially other forces -- to remain in country.
While I will not go in -- for obvious reasons -- to the details of those negotiations, I will state, and state as clearly as I can, the fundamental or first principle on which all those negotiations are based. It is respect for, acknowledgment of Iraq's sovereignty and an Iraqi national decision. What we, what other forces who may be present in Iraq at Iraq's request do, comes at Iraqi request, will come at Iraqi request. Actions will be undertaken in full coordination with Iraq. They will reflect an Iraqi decision. That has been, from the beginning, the premise of our negotiations. It will remain the premise of our negotiations.
The President of the United States has said that there is much noise. I think there is a better phrase in Arabic, tashweesh (ph), static, about what has happened. There is much simple misinformation. That's understandable, I think, given the fact that these are, of course, confidential negotiations. But there is also a considerable degree of deliberate disinformation. There are forces, both inside Iraq and outside Iraq, who do not wish to see Iraq progress with the assistance of the international community, with the assistance of the United States, frankly, who do not wish to see the government of Iraq succeed in its undertakings.
The government of Iraq has made clear, however, it will proceed in a direction it believes serves the interests of the Iraqi people, serves the interests of the Iraqi state, in moving forward toward greater stability, greater security. Our role in this process, as the United States -- and I would speak more broadly of the coalition, itself -- is to provide the help, the assistance that Iraq asks for, and to provide it in a way which fully and transparently is seen as undertaken within the frame of full Iraqi sovereignty and full Iraqi decision-making.
And with that, I am happy to take your questions.
MODERATOR: Well, thanks so very much, Ambassador. If I may ask the first question, there was a review published by the Defense Department about the status of Iraq. And we have maintained that, basically, the doors to negotiations with Iran in Iraq are not closed. What is the role of Iran in Iraqi at the moment?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: The government of Iran has stated repeatedly that its policy is one of respect for Iraqi sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Iraq's security. However, the government of Iran's behaviors in and towards Iraq, through the agency of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force, have not in any fashion reflected that rhetorical position.
The IRGC Quds Force has been engaged in financing, organization, training -- with the assistance at times of Lebanese Hezbollah -- and arming of the most violent, most radical elements in Iraq, elements that have engaged in direct violence against the Iraqi state, against Iraq’s security forces, as well as U.S. and coalition forces. This kind of behavior is not only inconsistent with Iran's stated policy towards Iraq, it is inconsistent with any international norm of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and borders for security of a neighboring state.
To take it back to the negotiations we are conducting with the government of Iraq on security arrangements, we have made very clear, both privately in those negotiations, and openly, in declarations from the President and others, we do not see Iraq as a platform for threat or attacks from Iraq to any other country, including Iran. We do not see the arrangements which we are discussing with the government of Iraq as directed against, challenging to any of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran. But we would hope and expect that all of Iraq's neighbors similarly respect the sovereignty, the integrity, and the security of Iraq.
For all of Iran's protestations about U.S. efforts to destabilize Iraq, I think the message here is, "Look homeward, angel." Iran needs to recognize what the rest of the world acknowledges. It is their behaviors, it is their actions in Iraq which have been destabilizing, which has fomented violence, which have bluntly challenged the authority of the state, as it has sought to establish law and order, the rule of law in lawless areas.
MODERATOR: Thank you.
QUESTION: Mina al-Oraibi, Asharq Al-Awsat newpaper. Ambassador, can I ask you regarding the SOFA agreement. Iraqis have said that they were able to get a concession from the American negotiating side regarding immunity for contractors. While I expect you don't want to talk about the details of the negotiation –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you.
QUESTION: -- everyone is talking about it. So, if you can, give us some clarification on this particular point.
And, if I may quickly, regarding the possibility of other coalition forces staying in Iraq in the future, are you -- have you come to any sort of understanding regarding what Britain would like to do?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: To take the first part of your question, I will not comment on the details of the negotiations. On the civilian contractor issue, though, I will only note the theme, as I stated, in advance of all of the negotiations, all the discussions we are having, is respect for, regard for, Iraqi sovereignty. That is something that Iraq has insisted upon. It is a quite logical and understandable insistence.
Contractors in Iraq play a very important role, an important role for the efforts of our military forces, as well as our civilian elements present in the country. We are in discussion with the government of Iraq over how this issue can best be addressed, can best be resolved. But I will make clear it will be done very much, and squarely, in the context of an Iraqi decision and Iraqi sovereignty.
With respect to your second question, certainly we do contemplate, as does the government of Iraq, the continuation of a presence in Iraq of vital coalition forces. But there again, this is a question of Iraqi decision, Iraqi will. And I will not speak for the UK, in terms of its positions on all of this, except to note that we are in very close contact with HMG, both in Baghdad, as well as here, in London, as our own discussions progress. But I will leave to them to characterize details of their own policy position.
QUESTION: Hosny Emam from the Kuwait News Agency. As far as the agreement you just referred to, we understand that there are going to be two agreements. One was security, and the general work which it will include (inaudible) the other aspects you just mentioned. Can you clarify this point?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, let us see what the negotiations actually produce, in terms of structures. What is important here is content. There are two separate issues being addressed. One is the question of how we lay out a strategic partnership, a description of a very broad forward-looking engagement between our two countries. The second is a very specific set of understandings and arrangements that will be necessary to replace the provisions currently offered in the UN Security Council Resolution 1790 for the presence and the operation of foreign forces in Iraq. Broad partnership, very specific arrangements to replace resolution 1790, both are under active discussion at this time.
QUESTION: So there are two agreements?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Both of these issues are under discussion, but I am not going to characterize further the particular form or structure of what may emerge from the negotiations.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.) Can you give us a sense of this apparent tonal changes between the Kurds and Baghdad --
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Excuse me?
QUESTION: Can you give us a sense about the apparent tonal change between Baghdad –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Total change?
QUESTION: Tonal.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Tonal? I'm sorry.
QUESTION: Tonal change between the Kurds and Baghdad over the long-awaited federal hydrocarbon law.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: You would have to tell me what the tonal change is you're referring to. I'm not quite sure I follow you.
QUESTION: Well, the Kurds have gone (inaudible) renegotiating. I talked to one minister, he has made comments that are far different from what he was saying a month ago. (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Sure. We believe a modern, progressive, and comprehensive hydrocarbon package -- including a hydrocarbon framework law, revenue sharing mechanism, reform mechanism for the ministry of oil/restructuring mechanism for the ministry of oil, as well as new arrangements for a national Iraqi oil company -- that package of four parts is an essential component to the development of Iraq.
It is not a U.S. issue, it's an Iraqi issue. But we, like others, do have views of what type of market, what type of economic approach is best in this world, in this day, for development of a sector like Iraq's hydrocarbon industry.
We are pleased at the dialogue being conducted between the Kurdish regional government leadership and the government of Iraq. We hope it produces agreement, and agreement in the near term on this comprehensive package.
It's been our view that this is less a matter of political differences, or political block differences, than it is a question of market approaches, market ideologies, economic ideologies. These are difficult questions. The views are strongly held on different sides regarding this issue, not just in Iraq, but elsewhere around the world. This is not a unique debate being conducted in Iraq on these kinds of principles: closed market/open market, a sector based upon technical service agreements or technical service contracts or production sharing agreements. You see this kind of deliberation, debate, decisions taken elsewhere in the hydrocarbon sectors around the world.
But Iraq is unique, in terms of both the potential of its hydrocarbon sector, as well as the national need for significant and fundamental modernization and development of that sector, which contributes over 90 percent of the country's GDP, as well as the need in Iraq for development full stock -- that is, for national reconstruction and development.
We very much hope these discussions do produce progress. We and others stand ready to help, to advise, but this is fundamentally an Iraqi national decision that has to be taken.
QUESTION: You mentioned the Sahwat movement as part of the reason (inaudible) security. I just wondered if you could explain right now the exact relationship between the U.S. and the Sahwat movement. I mean, just exactly what funding or exactly what their relationship is between each other, and how you want to see this in the future.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Certainly.
QUESTION: -- how they would be integrated into the army.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Right. The Sahwat movements, the Awakenings movements, have produced a body of individuals now referred to as the Sons of Iraq, Abna al-Iraq. The numbers -- and I don't have the most recent figures -- were around 100,000. These are young men, the majority Sunni, but also a significant number of Shi’i, who have moved out of, in many cases, engagement in violence against U.S. and coalition forces, against the Iraqi government and Iraqi forces, to a very different position in which they are now contributing to security, contributing to stabilization in their communities.
We are providing funding -- we, the U.S. government, the U.S. military -- for many of these individuals. But the concept is one of transition from U.S. organization, U.S. funding, to integration with Iraq's security forces, Iraq's non-security, non-military, civilian workforce so that, over time, this freestanding, so to speak, body, the Sons of Iraq, effectively ceases to exist and becomes, in a coherent and structured manner, part of the Iraqi workforce, part of -- in some measure, perhaps 20 percent -- Iraq's security forces.
Progress in that direction has already been made. Some 18,000 or 19,000 of the former Sons of Iraq have already been integrated by the Iraqi government into security or civilian workforces. This is a process over the course of this year and next which will need to continue. But certainly we would contemplate over this period that this becomes an Iraqi undertaking, this integration becomes a complete Iraqi process, and no longer a U.S.-directed or organized process.
QUESTION: And what do you think will be the impact of Anbar (inaudible)? And can you say something as to how that will work, as far as relations between Anbar and Baghdad?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Sure. Over half the provinces in Iraq have gone to provincial Iraqi control. Anbar will be, in a very short time, the most recent of these provinces to move. And I would expect, certainly, other provinces will move over the course of the months ahead.
It is a reflection of progress already made, rather than an event fraught with great drama and significance. It comes as a recognition of what has been achieved, rather than a spur for a dramatic change to follow. It is an acknowledgment of progress, and that progress has been dramatic, perhaps more in Anbar Province than anywhere else in Iraq. It establishes de jure what has already existed de facto, which is Iraqi responsibility, Iraqi primacy, Iraqi control over security developments in Anbar Province.
With respect to the relationship between Anbar and the central government, contained in the provincial Iraqi control understandings that are arranged for each province are specific steps that establish the relationship between civilian and security forces in a province, and central government authorities. But Anbar is not unusual. It will follow the same model as in previous provinces.
QUESTION: Ambassador, what is the status of negotiations with Iran at the moment –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Negotiations with Iran?
QUESTION: Discussions, dialogues.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: The United States held three rounds of direct discussions, along with the Iraqi government, with the government of Iran in Baghdad last year. The most recent round, I believe, was in August of last year. The United States remains, in principle, prepared for further potential meetings. That is, this channel has not been taken off the table, or somehow closed as a formal decision.
But we have also made no decision on the timing of a next potential round. We would want to see that, in fact, the scheduling of another round was likely, by reasonable judgment, to produce progress. And when we see such circumstances, when we believe timing is appropriate, this is something we will consider.
QUESTION: We're aware of a situation in the last couple of weeks, that Israel has been accused of conducting an exercise that would mimic an operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities. And former ambassador to the UN John Bolton, I think this week, said that the Israelis might use that period between the election and the inauguration for an attack on Iran. I want to get your view on, if that was to become a reality, how would that impact on the U.S.' efforts in Iraq?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I am not going to speculate on speculation. What I will state is the policy of the President of the United States. The President believes, his administration believes, that a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the challenge posed by Iran to the international community -- not just in Iraq, but elsewhere -- can be found. That is the course that we, the Security Council, our allies in the EU and elsewhere are embarked upon. And we do believe it can achieve success.
QUESTION: As far as the statement by General Petraeus regarding the use of money in Iraq. Can you clarify this, please?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Excuse me? What was his –
QUESTION: General Petraeus said, don’t hesitate to use money in order to pay (inaudible). It was a statement to this effect. Can you –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: I am not aware of the general's statement. What I can tell you is that both our forces, as well as our civilian efforts in Iraq have been, and will continue to be, focused on helping to improve stability on the ground, working with Iraqi partners.
There is certainly a financial dimension to that. As you know, the United States has had quite extraordinary assistance programs. So has the U.S. military, through the so-called CERP, or Commander's Emergency Response Program.
In terms of ability to help on the ground, not just at national levels but also at grassroots and provincial and sub-provincial levels to advance provision of services and stabilization, there is absolutely nothing new in that. This is a long-standing undertaking. It is an undertaking for which we -- the U.S. military, the Department of State -- have requested that the U.S. Congress funds to continue. But, again, nothing new whatsoever in that.
QUESTION: I am from the American Magazine, that is mainly read by Americans over here. Do you have any feelings as to how (inaudible) in Iraq will affect terrorist threats in Western (inaudible)?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, to the extent that greater stability and security in Iraq is a manifestation of a greater constraint on the activities of al-Qaeda in Iraq -- al-Qaeda is a global movement; Iraq is one significant front, but just one front in that movement -- any efforts to constrain al-Qaeda's ability to project itself, to develop a safe haven, contributes ultimately to greater security worldwide. But I will note it is but one front in a global challenge. So, while I guess there is a general principle that any place that al-Qaeda is pushed back on contributes globally to greater security from the al-Qaeda threat, I am reluctant to draw direct association between developments in Iraq and security threats to Americans in the UK or elsewhere. I am not sure that nexus exists, or really can be established.
MODERATOR: One last question.
QUESTION: Just two more questions. The first one, I think you said negotiations are ongoing between the U.S. and Iraq. I mean, most pundits are predicting it won't make deadline. Your opinion on that?
And the military front, it seems that the Jaish al Mahdi, you know, the Shia block, the final remaining obstacle to, you know, turning a corner in Iraq. Your opinion on that?
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Okay. Look, we and the Iraqi government want to see these negotiations come to a successful conclusion, an appropriate conclusion, as quickly as possible. We certainly hope that that can happen this summer.
What is important here is that the right arrangements be reached, arrangements which have the full agreement and understanding of Iraq's political leadership, the Iraqi government. They are going to be transparent. This is not a secret negotiation being conducted. It is going to be presented in a form that the Iraqi people can see. And so it is very important that they be done right, and that they be done with the full consent of Iraq's political leadership.
Do we believe that that can be done in the time frame that we and the Iraqis have set for ourselves? Yes, I still think that that's possible. But these are negotiations, and let's see how they move forward.
With respect to your second question, there are many challenges to security and stability in Iraq. Some are security, specifically, oriented: the challenge posed by extremists, whether al-Qaeda or violent elements of the Jaish al-Mahdi or the Iranian backed and armed special groups. Some are economic in character: absent or insufficient essential services; insufficient economic opportunities, job opportunities. Some are political: the need to continue and aggressively pursue and execute reconciliation. That's a long-term goal. It's not going to be accomplished next month or next year. All of them have to be moved on: security, economic steps, political steps, simultaneously.
Obviously, diminishing the challenge to the state by groups which had been involved in disrupting security, in fomenting violence, is very important. And the Iraqi people have responded quite well to the steps taken in Basra, in Sadr City, and now, literally, this week in Amara and Maysan Province, as well as efforts by Iraqi and coalition forces in Mosul, directed against al-Qaeda.
But those kinetic, those military steps -- just to underscore, because the point is fundamental -- have to be accompanied by equally robust, equally sustained economic and political measures. And we are very confident that if that comprehensive approach is taken and maintained, that the future of Iraq is bright, indeed.
MODERATOR: Well –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: We can take one, sure.
MODERATOR: One, yes.
QUESTION: Just to go back to Iran, I am wondering how your comments about finding diplomatic solutions, where some of the rumors that we have heard coming out of Washington recently about all options being on the table and –
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Well, "all options on the table" is not unusual language for any government to use. It is certainly not unusual for U.S. administrations over the past many decades to use. But that language has been accompanied by the language that I reiterated. We are confident, we believe a diplomatic resolution can be found to the challenge to the international community posed by Iran, and we are working closely with our partners both in the Security Council, as well as the European Union, to see that such a resolution can be found, can be achieved.
But the real question here is not one that should be addressed to me, or indeed, to the European Union, but rather, to the government of Iran: "Why have you not responded? Why do you continue to defy the will of the international community?" And that is not a question I am able to answer. Only the government in Tehran can do so.
MODERATOR: Well, thank you so very much, Ambassador.
AMBASSADOR SATTERFIELD: Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you all.
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